The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution

The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution
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Total Pages : 0
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:1404364622
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Book Synopsis The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution by : Beck

Download or read book The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution written by Beck and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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