Managerial Entrenchment and the Choice of Debt Financing

Download or read book Managerial Entrenchment and the Choice of Debt Financing written by Mr.Amadou N. R. Sy and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1999-07-01 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The paper analyzes the choice between public and private debt by an entrenched manager. The model shows that when the firm’s credit risk is low, management issues public bonds because of the value gains from increased flexibility rather than reduced restrictions and monitoring. In fact, management’s expected private gains decrease as initial private debt restrictions are selectively relaxed. In contrast, when credit risk is high, management issues private debt because of the value gains and private benefits from renegotiating more stringent restrictions. When the maturity of private debt is shortened, however, privately and publicly placed bonds can be preferred to bank debt.