Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy

Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy
Author :
Publisher :
Total Pages : 44
Release :
ISBN-10 : OCLC:248387736
ISBN-13 :
Rating : 4/5 (36 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy by : Michael Woodford

Download or read book Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy written by Michael Woodford and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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Is it desirable that central banks be more transparent in the communication of sensible information when agents have diverse private information? In practice, t